Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1970

Stephen Simpson v. General Motors Corporation : Respondent's
Brief

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Harold G. Christensen; Attorney for Respondent
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Simpson v. General Motors, No. 11630 (1970).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4787

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

I
In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STEPHEN Sil\IPSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
a corporation,

(

Case No.
11630

Defendant and Respondent.
BRIEF' OF DEFEKDANT AND RESPONDENT
AppPal from a J ud.l-,'1llt>Ht of tlw Thrid District Court

In and for Salt Lake County, Utah
The Honorable D. Frank "\Vilkins, Judge

"\VORSLEY SKO'V &
CHRISTENSEN and
HAROLD G. CHRISTENSEN
7th Floor, Continental Bank
Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for DPfrndant and
Respondent
WOODRO'V D. 'YHITE
2121 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Appellant

D

.\'.\TUU·: OF TJIE ('ASE

1

ur;-;POSJTIO.\ OF TffE CASE IX THE LOWER COURT

1

SCWCJIT 0.\ APPEAL

2

;-,T.\TL.\IE.\T OF F.\CTS

l'OI.\T I.

2

TJ!l: IJOCTRI.\E OF STRICT LIABIL-

ITY IS .\OT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE.
POI.\T 11.
!TY
1'01.\'T

THE DOCTI\I.\E OF STRICT LIABIL-

rs .\OT THE LA w OF l."TAIL ..
III.

2

THERE

WAS

.. ...

9

SL'FFICIENT En-

UE.\CE OF CO.\TRIBl:TORY NEGLIGENCE TO

Sl'B.\!IT TIL\T ISSL'E TO THE JURY ..
POI:\T I\".

TIIE C'OCRT DID .\'OT ERR IN RE-

19

CEI\'IXG EXHIBITS 17 AND 18
POJ);T \'.

TIIE COCRT DID .\'OT ERR IN GIV-

I.\G IXSTHCCTIOX NO. 16

l'OIXT \'I.

....................... 20

TIIE COURT DID XOT ERR IN GIV-

ING IXSTHL1 CTION NO. 18

('0:'\CLL"SIOX

...... 12

............ 22

24

l\'IH:\:

(('!l11t.l

CASES CITED
Dallison v. Sl'urs, Rol!uuck and Cu., '10 Cir. 1962) :31;3
F.2d ;\ .t:l
li1

ii'

E.>ta 1 c uf Ei:k11, l'.l Utah 2d 414, 432 P.2d 45 (1%7)

Gularnll"icz v. lraul, 119 Gtah Gll, 2:lo P.2d 57G
Gath1rnrt

I'.

Buryiu,

I

Conn. 19liS

I

1

11
'.!

l'.151 J

21G A.2d 1S9, Illinoi:;

] IJ

Goldbuy v. Kollsman Instrument Curp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191

N.E.2d 181 (19631

lll

Gree;znwn v. Yuba Pu1nr Pruducts, Inc., 29 Cal. 2d ,17,
377 P.2d 897 (1960)

]II

Hall v. BlacJ:liam, 18 Utah 2d 1G·1, 417 P.2d 664

22

Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.
2d 69 (1960) .....

C. D. HlTme, Inc. v. T1rny Co., 294 S.W. 2d

lU
(1956)

lU

Hooper v. General Motors Corporntion, 123 Utah 515, 260
p .2d 549 (1953) ...

9, 11

Joseph v. Groves LDS Hospital, 10 Utah 2d 94, 348 P.2d
935 (1960)

Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, CCII Products Liability Reporter Paragraph 5501 (1965)
.. ...................

24

10

I \'" DE X --- ( ( '" n t . )
Page
Pl'tflnyill v. Perkin;;, 2 Utah 266, 272 P.2d 185 (1954)______________

9

Snvoda v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 6121, 210 N.E.

2d 182 (1965) - ---- - - ---- ...

--- --- -- - ------ - - ------------------------ 10

S1Cain v. Boeing Airplane Co., (2 Cir. 1964) 337 F. 2d 940 _______ 11

ST A TUT ES CITED
Section 402A, Restatement of the Law of Torts (second)
( 1965) -- --- ·------- -------- ------------------------------------------------------------------ 10
Section 165 ( 1), l\Iotor Vehicles, 60 C.J.S., P. 935 ______________________ 21

In !he Supreme Ctr}Mrt cf the State of Utah
STEPHEN
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
(; l·:X !·:HAL :JlOTOTIS CORPORATION,

Case No.
11630

a <'Orporntinn,

by
:111 ;i 11111!< il 1i l1· I 1:ii nt<·r <l'..'.·ain:-:t <lll autorno1Ji!1• rnanufac11i 1··r h;1..,1·d 111J11ll 1wgli.'..'.·1·111·1· in tliP lle:-:ig11 of an auto111111 Ii II'.
an ;wtI1111 for p<·r:-:mial i11,juri<':-: lirnught

Tl1i:-:

Tl1i:-'
11.
111

:1

11

tri1·d to :1
in the lo\\'l'l" eonrt, the
I l. l·'1·:1!1k \\"ilkin:-:, 11n·:-:i11inp:. Trial

l':t:-'1' \•

r;b·I

;1:1d

.ii'.1

.\l<>tion l"l)r

llt

in LtY(ll'

Xl'\\.

01"

11H· dl'f1•1111nnt.

Trial wa:-: dt>nie<L

This
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RELIEF SOUGHT OX
Respondent seeks affirmance of the Judgment of
Dismissal.

STATE.MENT OF I11 ACTS
Appellant claims that the facts do not support tlw
verdict and then proceeds to recite that vPrsion of th(•
facts least favorahle to th<· YN<lid.
HowevPr, in this ap1wal th<' <·vi<l<'Jw<· i:-: of prirnar:importance only to Point Tl!. H<·spond<·nt \\·ill, th<•r(·fore, rectify A1Jpellant's version of th<· fads 1u1d<'r tltnt
point.

POINT

L THE DOCTRINE OF STRICT LIABILITY IS

NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE.

Tlw plaintiff lms<•d ltis (•as<> llpoll iwglig«•Jlc-(•,

Jl()t

upon

strict liabilifr. He all<•g<•d in his Cornplai11t:
"That the <l<·frndant was rn•glig<'nt, can•less
and heedless in the rnanuf'adnn• and d(•sign of
the said 19GG Chl•vrold lrnpala in the· f'ollo\\·ing
partiC'ulars:

tl1at thP <h•sig-n and arrangP1rn·nt of
tl1P torqu<' tPnsion rod and tension bar
µ;11i<l<' on th<· l!Jtiti frnpala station wagon was
high J:; dang<·rnus to th" bodily safl-'ty and
lif'!' of
1wrson \\·ho rnight he called upon
to l'<'lllO\"<'
tail g-ah• assPrnhly for the
JHHpos1·s of n•pai r or for otlu•r purposes.
(a)

(b) that th<· dangl-'rous arrangPrnent of
tlH· torqrn• tPnsion rod assembly constituted
a hidd1·n da11gl'r.

( c·) that thc•n· was no warning provided
any\\ l1H1· on said station \\·agon or else\\ l1t·rc· to in form thP plaintiff or make known
to him th<' <·xistPnC<' of such hidden danger
ancl tl1<' pn·('autions nPcPssary to avoid serious li0<li
injury." ( R. 1, :2).
Plaintiff all<·g<·<l in his Complaint also that those
srw!'if'i<' J1C',!..dig-1·nt ads and omissions directly and prox<·ausPd his injnri!'s (R. :2).
TJ1p d1·f'<·n<lant in its .\ns\\'PI' dPnied negligPnce and
assc•rt.·d
th<' d<'ft.nsPs of eontrilmtory nPgliL;c·rn·(' and
assumption of risk (R. G).
'1''11· plaintiff suln11itt<•d IntP1Togatories to which
( )Jijc·d ions and .\ nsm•rs \\·<·n· IIJ<Hl<'. The dPfrndant took
d1·positions. . \ l'l"drial <·onf'.. r<>11<'<' \\·as lwld lwfore the
llo11orahl<' Bryant II. Croft. A Pn•trial ordPr was entPn·d sdti11g forth tl1<' <·ontt•11tions and isstws in this
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''Plaintiff eonten<ls that tlH• d<>f Prnlnnt was
negligPnt in onP or 111on• of th<> following partienlars:
] . 1'hat tlw dt>sig11 and
of th1·
tonpw t<•nsion r0<l and te11sion liar gnid"
on the said station wagon \\'as highh·
dangr-rous to hodil!- saf°<'t» and lil't· of
any person who 111igltt lw eall<·<l upon to
rt-'lllO\"<' tlit• tail gatt• asst•111lil:-· for llH·
pnrpos<•s of rt-pair or for oth<T purposvs.
1'hat tlw dang<·rous arrnng<·111rnt of tlw
torqlH' t<'nsion rod ass<•111hl!· C'onstitut<·d
[l hi<ld<•n dang<·r.
3. 1'liat tll(•n• was no warning provid<'d an_,._
\\"h<·n· on the station \ragon or t•ls1·,d1Pn' to inform tlw plaintiff or to 1nak1·
known to him 1lw <·xist<·n<'<' of su<'l1 hiddt·11
dangPr and thP Jll"(•eanio11s rn·<·<·ssary 111
avoid s<·rious hodil!· injury.

''In addition to tlw fon•going parti<'ulars of'
nt>gligPner, thP plaintiff' ask<·<l l<·m·<· to ad<l as <Ill
of his cans<• of adio11 ti!(' dodri1w of r<'s
ipsa loqnitur and sai(l leave \\·as grant<•d.
"Plaintiff' fnrtltN <'<>11t<·1Hls tliat th<·
genrP of the def<·ndant in tl1P partiC'ulars all<•gt•d
and sPt forth ahov<· was the sol<• proximate rans<:
of tlw injuri<•s to }Jlaintiff.
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"'J)pf(·ndant <lPni<'S t]iat it was negligent in
or 1nor<' thP particulars al1Pged, or at all,
d(•ni('s tliat thP doctri1w of re8 ipsa ]oquitur appli(•s and f'mtl1<·r all<•g<·s that th<' plaintiff was
guilt>- of <'ontrihutor>· rn•gligenee and that such
<'ontriln1tor>· rn•gligPnr<' on the part of plaintiff
\nls Pith<>r tlw sol<> proxi1natP causp or a contributing- prnxi111at<' caus<> of his injuries and that
ht> <'annot in <·itlH·r 1·vPnt r<>cover. DPfPndant all1·g·1·s that tl1<' plaintiff was guilty of contributory
rn·glig1·rwP in orw or rnorp of the following part i(·nlars:
01w

(a) That hP failPd to follow the instructions
in thP s<>1Tiet> manual or to eonsult it.
( h) That h<' lo\\·Pr<>d th<> tail gatP beyond
th1· limit of thP torq1w tPnsion rod and
did so nndPr tPnsion without informing
hirns\'lf or inquiring of tlw probable con-

( (') HP fail<•d to kP<'P a pro1wr lookout for
th<' loeation of tlw torque tension rod as
!1<' lowpn•<l th<' tail gatf>.
( d) That h<' fail(•d to lwt>d warning of a frl-

lo\\· ('Jllj>lo>·(·(': JUllllPI>·· Ha>· rr<', and in relllOVing the tail gatt> at all for the purpos\' of painting it.

( (') Plac<'<l hi111s(•lf in a position of danger
in low1•ring thP tail gatP.
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"The issnPs to he tried in this cast>, therdore,
are as folloms:

I. \Yas the d<·frndant negligPnt in on(• or
lllOrP of th€' partirulan; all<>ged ancl set
forth ahovP as Jtprns 1, 2 and :1.

II. If so, was such nPgligern·<• on tlw part of
defendant tlw sole ]Jroxirnatp eause of thP
injury to plaintiff.

llI. If so, what darnagPs, if any, would thP
plaintiff he entitlPd to n·c·ov<'r.

lY. Under the faets and ein·trnu.;tarn·es of th<'

c·asP, does thP doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
apply.

Y. \Vas thP plaintiff guilty of <'ontirilmtory
negligPnC<' in on<' or rnon• of th<' partienlars alleged and set forth ahon• as Iterns
(a), (h), (<'), (d) and (d.

YI. If so, was snd1 eontrilmtor>· rn•glig(•JWP
on the part of the plain ti ff <·ither tltP sok
proximate• cans(• or a eontrihnting proximah• cause of the injury to th<· plaintiff."
(R. 33-35)

Rule 16, U.R.C. P. providPs rdative to prl'trial confrn·ncPs :

7

"Th(• <·ourt shall lllakP an ordPr whieh rPcites
t 11(• ad ion tak<·n at tlH· <'Onfrr<'m'P, thf-' amend111"nt :-: allo\\'(•d to th1• pl1·;Hlings, and tlH-' agree111<·nt:-: 11iad(• h.\· ti)(' parti(•:-: as to any of tlw matters
('onsid(·n·d, and \rhit'l1 limits tlH• issnPs for trial
to tlio:-:(• not dispos1·d of h_\· admissions or agree11wnts of (·ciuns(·I: and stwh onlPr whPn entered
('ontrnls 111<' s11lis<'q11<·11t <·ounw of the action/
t111lc·ss 111odi f'i<·d at tl1<' trial to pr<•vPnt manifest
i 11.i ll st i (' ('.
Th<· .\ pp('llant 111ad1· no n'qlwst for a modification
of t]1p J>rdrial Ord('!" ('ith1•r at tlu· trial or at any other
ti11lt'.
J'laintiJTs n"<fll(':-:t<•<l ln:-:tnlC'tions to the jury sub111ittt·d tl1<· 11wrning of trial \\·1·n· all dirPctNl toward
111·!...!:li!..'.t'll<'t'. l'laintiff's B('(fll<':-:tPd Tn:-:tn1f'tion No. 1 told
tli1· jur"'_\· it \ms th<· duty of the defPndant to infonn users
ol' any risks not
oh:-:1Tn1hll' and that tlw failurf'
to dci so would l'on:-:titut<• 1wglig<'nc·P. (R . .+3).
PlaintifTs HPqll<'StPd lnstrnetion Xo. :2 told the jury
it \\·as tl11· d1·frnda11t's duty to <'lirninate dangers which
irl\'oh·P i11(•xp1•nsiYt' !llodif'ieations of clesii-,rn and that the
l'ailnn· to do :-:o \\·011111 eonstitnfr n<'gligt>nCP (R. .+.+).
Both of t])(':-:<· instructions \\'(']'(' gin•n in part hy the
( '011 rt.

H.\· HP(pu·st\'d ln:-:trndion Xo. 4 the plaintiff asked
tl1<• Court to L'Xplain that h<' \\·as not rPquirPd to guard

8

against dangc>r in plact>s whPre it 1s not PXJH•ete<l to lJe
(R. 4G). This instrudion was giYrn in part.
X 0 instructions basl'U Upon t}w dodriJIP or st rid liability wen) suhmitt(•(l to th(• <'ourt.
<·ouns<'l !'or
the plaintiff did n·qn<>st tlw eourt to instnH't tlw jury
that the d0frndant had fai !Pd to sustain its hunl(•JI o!'
<r<'n<·<·' h<' di<!
l ffoof on thP dd<>nse of eontrilmtory• rn·1rli
M
h
not request that tontrilmtor>· 1wg·ligc•nc·1• lH• Pli111inat1·d
of its not <"onstituting a l<·µ:al dd"Pnsc· (It :il ).
[n Instrucion Xo. 10 th<• court told th<• jury tliat
tlH• mPl'l' faet an ac-<'id(•nt happ<·rn·<l did 11ot prov<• that
Pitlwr tlH• plaintiff' or th<· d<·frndant \\'as nq.dig<·nt
65r Xo 0xct>ption was tak<'n to this instrndion.
ln its lnstrudion Xo. 11 th(• <'Ollrt d<·ri1wd nq.;li
crence ' contrilrntory'"' npo·liO'('ll<'('
ordinan·
<·an· arnl J>l'O\:t:>
r. h
'
.
imate cause (R. G5). X o Pxeeiition ,,·as takc·n to tl1is
instruction.
In its Instrnetion Xo. 13, th<• <'<>nrt told tlH· jmy
that a mannfaetnn•r \\·as n•quin•d to <'X<'r<'i:-:<· ordi1wr:-·
ean· in tlw rnanufadun• of anto111ohil<•s (It li!I). Xo <''.:e<'ption was tak<·n to this instnwtion.
From th(' ('Ollllll<'JH'('lll<'Jlt or this adion until aft< r
it was submitted to th<· jury t\rn y<·ars lat<·r, both ti)('
plaintiff and tlw dc,frndant n·li<'<l upon Im,·

11_,. Iloo;wr r. 01'1/l'rrtl J!otors Crn;Joration, 123 Utah G15,
:.'.liO J>.:.'.d :->+!) ( l!J:->:l) as lwing th<• law of this easP. l!ooper
l1olds tl1at a lll<.lllul'adnn·r's liability rPstf; upon neglil!:• •Jl('('.

It is fm1<1an11·11tal that a part.\- may not attempt to
/il'!C:llad•· tlw tr:al ('Olirt of()]](' thf'OJ'_\' and, if llnSUCCPSS1'111. a(h·mw" a di i"J'<·n·11t tht'ory 011 app<'al. If the law
'' 1·11· ntl11•n\·is(•, a trial \\"<mid IH• a ll!PrP proving ground
and ;1pp<·llatt· pro1·1·du11· a sliarnhl<·s.

T lH · au ti 10 r it i <·s an.· n Ullll' rnus Lu t ei tation of two

l 1() u Id I).(. :-: ll rfit· i I• ll t :
I

.:\l<1th·r:-: 111·itl1(•r rais1·d in thl· plPadings nor put
tll

i:-:su1· at tlll' trial eannot IH' eonsicl<•n•d for th,3

l'i rst ti111<· on app1·al. /11 re f,'state of E'kker, 19 rtah

:.'.d + 1+. +:l:.'. P.:.'.d. +:-> ( 1%/).
A Jl<l rt:· \\·lio h:· Iii:-: mm pl1·adings, PvidPncP and

n·11111·st<·d instrudions tri1·s and rests his casP upon
a <"ntain tl11·111:· is hound l>y that theory which tht>n
IH·t·o11w:-: 1li1·

b\1·

ol' tl1l' <'HS!' and eannot upon appf'al

sl1il't to <11wfl}('r tl11•or;· or position. Petti11:1ill r. PN-

l.i11'. :.'. 1·tali :!d :!(iii,:!/:.'. P.:!d JSj (Hl:i-J.).
POI:\'T II.
>:()T

THE DOCTRINE OF STRICT LIABILITY IS

TIIE L\ \\' OF l'T:\H.

10
The doctrine of striet liabiliy has m'ver lw<>n ado1Jted
in Utah and is only a minority rule in Anwriran jurisdirtiom; as a \\·hohi. Tlw statt>s of California, Gn'e1rnzan
L
Yulw Pmrer Products, Inc., 29 Cal. 2d -ri,
P.2ll
S97 (UWO), Comwctient, nart711rnrt r. flurgio (Conn.
l9G5) 2Hi A.2d 189, Illinois, Surnrfo L TT'liitc Motor Co.,
3:2 111. 2d ()121, 210
:M rn2 (19<i5), Kt>ntueky, C. D.

llerme. Inc. r. T1rny Co., 29-1- 8.\\'. 2d :5:3+ (195<>),
Jle1111i11,qson L Hloomfi<'lrl Jllotors. !lie., 32 "0: .• J.
:158, Hil A.2d G9 (19()0), Ne\\· York, Gold!J!'rq I'. Kollsman Insnrmrnt Corp .. 12 K.Y. 2d +:32. 191 N.K 2d 1Rl
( 19G3) and Oklahoma, Marat71011 flattery Co. r. Kilpatrick, CCR Products Liability
Paragraph 5501
(19G5) appear to lw the only Ameriean jurisdictions

t>Ill-

hraeing- strict liability. En•n its arrhit<>c·t, Dean Pross .. r,
elairns only H jnris<lietions.
SPction -1-02A of tlw HPstatP!ll(•nt of th<• Law of Torts
( 8Pcond), puhlislwd in 19()5 hy the Anwrica.n l . . aw lnstitutt> Pxt<·ndP<l its statp11wnt of tlw law as appli<>d to food
and products for intimate

us<" to all pro<luets.

Th<' dP('isions did not and do not justi I\ that (•xfrnsim1.
Th(• function of tlH· Arn(•f'i('an La\\· I nstitnt<• is to
stat<· what th<> g<·n<•ral <·mm11on law of' tlw l 'nit<"<l Stat1•s

i:-:, not what it rnay

h<'<'OllH'.

This should lw i111pli<·it in

th(• tPrrn ''R<>state>mPnt" hut D<·an Pross<'!' who is n•sponsihl<> for SN·tion -1-0:2A himsdf aC'knowl('dgl's that

11
S(·<·l ion -W'.2.\ statPs onl!· a minority rule. In urging its
ndoption upon th(• rnernlwrship of the Anwrican Law
InstitntP, DPan J>ross<T said:

"Xo on<' lias to he any sPer or sooth-sayer to
for<'S('<' that this is lweorning the law of the im111<·diat<' futurP
"I mmld Y<·ntnn• to prt>dict that in another
;)() !·<·ars
has fair ehanees of becoming a majority ml<· in thP rnitPd Stat<•s, . . . " (-n ALI
ProePrdings, 1%+ ( 19()5), p. 8;}0-51.)
f n l'tah rnanufadun·rs are liable only if negligent.
TltP lcrn· of l-tah is as sPt forth in Hooper v. GPneral
.lfolnrs ('orporafio11, supra, whPrP tlw eourt said:

"Thus, to irnpose liability on an assembler
of an auto111nhilP ePrtain nt>eessary elP11ients must
h1• !lladP out. Plaintiff is reqnin•d to shffw: ( 1)
a d(•!\·div(• "·l1<>rl at the tiinr of automobile assemhI:·: ( :2) sueh dPfret lwing- diseoverahle by reasonahl<· im;pPction: (:1) injury eaused by the failure
of thP 'rh(•Pl du<· to it:-: df•fective eondition.''
I•'nrtlwrmon·,<·,·pn if it hP as:-;umt>d for purposes of
ar.i..:w1wnt that tl1<· dodri1w of strict

should b<•-

<·0111<' tl1e law of ('tali, that doetrin<' would not preclude
<·Yidt>nC'P of rnisu:-;<' or ahnon11al u:-;<>. Contributory negli;.;<·m·<· in tltat sP11s<' i:-; a defense to an aetion based upon
lm·:u·li of \\·anant:·, J)el!isr)}I r. Senrs, Rorlmck and Co.
(Ill Cir. 1%:!)

F.:?<1. :i-l:l or striet

Swain

L
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Boeing Airplane Co., (2 Cir. 19G-!) 3;37 F.'.2d 9-10,
fense withdrawn by defendant).
POINT III.

THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE TO SUBi\IIT THAT ISSUE
TO THE JURY.

"jlr. Simpson lwp;an working around <'ars ·when 11"
"-as 11 yPars old, ht>lping his fat11c•r who was abo a <·ar
paintt>r (R.
He took auto mPehani('s \\·hen a soplwmore at Granite High 8C'hool (R.
During this <·ours"
lw hermne familiar with tlw us!' of sP1Ti('P 111mrnals. (H

319). 'Ylwn a junior, hl' 1rnrk<·d for Litten's Bod:· Shop
doing both hod:· work and painting ( H.
:!95. :ill).
Brtwe<·n his junior and s<'1110r
rs, h<' \\'Pl'kPd at
Capital ChnTolt't as a ]>ainter ( H. :!9;'"l) and wh<·11 111·
graduated from high se11ool in .Jmw, 1!Hil, lw w<'nt tu
work full-time at Capital Cheyrolf't ( R. :!97).
Simpson liacl l><,<'11 painting <'ars f'ull-ti1n<• u10n•
than four years lwfon· tl1is ae<·id('nt o<·<·ll!T<'<L f J,. "'11."
hoth trained and exp(•ri<·rn·<·<L 11 <' eould ohsl'l'n- and
appn·riat<• n1<>ehanieal r<'lationsliips.
At the tim<· of the aeeidPnt, lw \\·a;-; prq1aring to paint
tlH· tail gatP of a J 9(iG Chv\Trolet station \nl,i_;On. rro avoid

tlw npeessity of masking- thP ehrou1<• tail µ;at<' support!',
he rPrnnY<>d the srn•ws attaehing th(• support to the tuil

!..'.·att· and. \\·ith the as:-;istaneP of a fellow
l>i·an l ·r··. lo\\·l'rPd th<· tail gatP helow
far to }H'l"lllit tlw torqrn.. rod
it,; n·tainn and strikt> r. Sirnpson i11 t!H•

<·mployee, Ray
the horiz.ontal
to eseape from
l1<>ad.

1·. l. n· tPstifo·d hi• was askPd h.'· r. Simpson for
:t lwnd ( B. :.!10).
r. Si11qJsm1 had n·111oy1·d thP supports
;111d \\"(lS hol1linµ; tlH· tail gatP up. 1Ie told Hay rre that
111· \ms ;..;oing to !Pt it d0\n1 and asked him to help R. 212) .
.\s th('·'· lo\\·l'r<'d it. Ha.'· on th<· Jiass1·ng-er side and Simpson on tliP driY1·r sidt•, Ha.'· notiC'<>d that tlw torque rod
\\·as at thP point \\·hpn• if thP tail g-atP was let down
f11rtlwr it \rn11icl r·ornf.. ont of thP rPtainf-'r (R. 212).
II(· :-:aid. "lfold it. I think that thing- therP is ahont to
t·o1111• out of' th1· :-:ta:·." Simpson n•pliP<l. •'•Lpt's just }pt
this dO\rn a littl1• 1110n·." ( H. :.!1:.!). As thp:· }pt tlw tail
!..'.·at<' down f'urtl1<•r tl11• rod ram<> ont from tlH• retainer
and :-:tnwk Simpson in th1• f'on,•head. l'r<' stat1•d it was
1101 1·11sto111ar:· to n•1110Y<' tliP :-;npports to paint a tail
'-'.;\(•· (I:. :.!J:l).
i·n· 1·x1·n·i:-:e1l
eantion than
('\.t•Jt t liongh Si11qlson \ra:-: tlw orn• rpsponsihlP for tl11..•
\\'(IJ'k.

Si111pson knl'\\"" that thP tail gatP rontainP<l a mt>ehan1:-:1ll for rnnking it <'asi<'r to mis<' thr· tail gate (H. 331 ).
I It• bw,,· tlii:-: 1111·1·krni:-:rn \\·a:-; a rod whi<'h workPd up and
dO\rn i11:-:idl· a guid(• ( B. :i;i:n. lie a<'knmdt><lg-ed that tht•
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working of fop l'()(l arnl µ:uidl' W\'I'<' "ohyio11s", "apparPnt' arnl "notic<'ali!P'' (H.
It wa::-; al:-:o appan·nt
from tlu' l'()(l its1•ll' that is in('Ol'JHlrat1•d no t'<·at11r<· \\·l1i<"h
\\·onld Jll'<'YPnt it from <"0111ing- frnm thP n·tain<·r ( H. :i:l-t ).
To lw
ol'
n<·g·Jig·<·n<·<>, it is 11ot Jl<'<·<·:-:to antieipatP th(• pn•<"isP \\-a\· harm <·an IH'fall.

Ht> adrnitt(•d that hP kll\'\\'

that it' 11<·
had dis<·omwd1•(l th1· n•taiiwr tli<·n· \\·onld haY<· h<·<·11
no t<'nsion on th<> rod (H. ;3:m). II<> a('knm\·l<·dµ:('d that
when warnt•<l by
l"n·, h<' turn<·d i111111('diat<·ly arnl
look<>d din·etly at th<• rod (H. :n1i). This is at l1·a:-:t
circumstantial <·Yi<ll'rn'<' of an mnH<'Jl(•ss or tlw rod·:'
propcn:-:iti<•s.
Si111pson's t'XJH'l't \Yitrn·ss. Profrssor Brown, agT<·<·d
that tlw fundion an<l
or tli(' torqu<· J'()(l
wt>n• oll\·ion:-:. 11 <' ti's ti fil'd
\\'011111 YOU (l<r]"(•(• \YitJ1 h<r(•J](•ra]I\·
t)l(• }J\ll"})()S\'
..
of thi:-; torsion rod is to rnakl' tlH• tail g-at1·
<·a:-;iPr to rais<' !
..

r-"l

A.
Q.

Arnl wh<•n :•on first <•xa111in<·d tliP :rntOJnohil(•
slio\Yll in tlw pl10tog-raphs, \\·as tl1<' loeation
of tlw (•JJd or t liis torqll<' rod ohyio11s to you!
f:<.

•

..
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Q.

\\'as it ohyions to yon that thl' purpose of
that was to aet in a s<>nse as a

\\'as it oh\·ions to you that if tlw tail gate
\\"(•]"(• lo\Y('n·<l lwyond tlw limit of the rod,
that it would C'OllH' out of tlu.• rt'tained

Q.

'.\'as it ohyions to :mu that if it did come out
of that rdainer, that it would eome out under
t<·nsion'

.\.

I stron)..!·h· si1sp<·d('d this. It is a little bit
di l'fi<"11lt to ];no\\. <·xa<"tl>· thP rPlationship of
tl1<· sprin.!.'.' for<'<' as th<· hing-P IllOYf'S out.
You k1ww th('n• had to }w some load on it;
otl1<·n,·is" it <'ouldn't ad as a rountPr-halanee .

.\.

Y<·s. That is in it:-: horizontal position. Being
lllll\'(•(l }H">'OTI<l thP horizontal fWSiton, yon
111ig-ltt <·<>n<·('iYahly PX}J('<'t sorn<'thing. T woulrl
(•xp1d it to IH' undPr tPnsion, hut it is not
quit<' ol1Yious.

(J_

.\ wl
would l'X}ll'd th1• farther
moved,
tl11· !..:Tl·:d1·r th(' h·nsion, just likP wlH·n you
pull a ho\\ .

. \.

Y(•s, althoud1 tht• llHllllll'I" in whieh tlw hingt•
111ons 011t, it
- it isn't a simplP
<'\<'list· 1111·. it isn't a sirnpl(• pi\·ntPd hing-<'.
,..

.
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Q.

And in working on any counter-balancing or
counter-balance system, it is ordinarily necessary to disarm the svstem brfore vou take
it apart, isn't it? In. other words, ·take the
load off of it before you take it apart.
* * *

A. That would appear to he prudent, yes." (R.
155-158)
Although Professor Brown could not visualize the
exact effect of the offset hinge, the fact that the rod was
under tension when the door was open ·was abundantly
clear.
Frank Anderson, age 58, Body Shop Manager, employed by Capital Chevrolet Company was 81h years
and in the automobile service industry for 40 years, had
general supervision over the painters and the body repairmen (R. 171, 172, 173).
He testified that the custom and practice would be
to mask tpe tail gate supports and paint. It would not
have been customary to remove them (R. 180). If it
·were necessary to remove the supports, a body man
would have done it (R. 181).
\Vilby Hall, 0mployed at Capital ChPvorlet for 39
years as paint foreman, testified that the practice and
custom for painters would have been to mask the supports and paint tlw tail gafo and then if it \\'Pre neccissary
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to remove a support, that job would have been turned
over to the hody shop foreman \Vho would have asked
one of the body men to do it. He said as long as he had
had the shop they had not removed such supports (P.
201).
Don Victor \V el ch, employed by Bennett Ford at
the time of the trial but at Capital at the time of the
accident, had worked for ·Capital since 1951 (R. 205).
He testified that the customary way would have been to
mask the chrome and paint. Overspray on chrome can
be removed wi.th
thinner (R. 207).
Contributory negligence by definition is a deviation
from the way prudent men customarily act. Indeed, the
standard of care derives from custom and practice unless
from statutory mandate.
Simpson himself acknowledges that the was not required to remove a door, a bumper, a grill or a tail gate;
this was the responsibility of body men (R. 298, 349, 350).
He admits he could have painted the tail gate from inside the car (R. 345).
Although he
familiarity with the precise way
the tail gate was counter-balanced, he acknowledged that
he knew the tail gate \Vas counter-balanced or had some
mechanism to make it close (R. 3-1-9) and admitted he
would not have opened a storm door, putting the closing
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mechanism under tension and tlwn removing the mechanism from the door (R. 3-±9). He admits he could have
painted the tail gate without removing the supports (R.
329) or by removing the support from one side at a
time (R. 339). Unnecessarily departing from customary
ways, with an appreciation of the potentiality of some
harm, is contributory negligence.
In addition to departing from the customary practice, Simpson failed to follow the directions in the Fisher
Body Service Manual for the removal of the tail gate
supports or the removal of the tail gate.
That manual provided the following instructions:
"TAJL GATE SUPPORT ASSEMBLIES
Removal and Installations

ti on.

1. Open tail gate and support it in that posi-

2. Remove screws securmg support to tail
gate . . .
* * *

"TAIL GATE ASSEl\fBLY
Removal and Installation
1. Open tail gate . .
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2. Raise tail gate to an approximate vertical
position to relieve torque rod tension. Remove
torque rod retainer attaching screws and remove
retainer . . ."
* * *
Simpson kne'IV servire manuals were available at
tlw office and knt>w that service manuals showed how to
dismantle cars, yet he made no inquiry of anyone in the
hody shop and no reference to the manual (R. 320, 326,

E.x. 1).

This evidence, and that of significant departure
from customary practice, at the very least raised a jury
question as to Simpson's contributory negligence.
POINT IV. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RECEIVING
EXHIBITS 17 AND 18.

Contrary to appellant's assertion, Exhibit 17 was
not offered or received. Exhibit 18, the Fisher Body
Service l\fanual, was properly admitt(•d in evidence.
One of the claims \Yas that tlH'I'l' was no warning provided anvwliere on the station wagon or elsewhere to
inform the plaintiff or make known to him the precautions m'cessary to avoid serious bodily injury (R. 34).
Bv
. wav. of foundation ' it was established that there
was a Fisher Body Se>1TirP l\Ianual pertaining to the
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1966 model in the shop manager's office. Mr. Simpson
knew of this and knew that the manual provided directions on dismantling cars (R. 320). This evidence was
admissible to negate the allegation of no vvarning as
well as to support the charge of contributory negligence
based upon failure to make reasonable inquiry or to
follow the directions set forth in the service manual.
vVhen Exhibit 18 was offered, objection was made
on the ground that it was not specifically called to the
attention of the plaintiff or that he was instructed to
:refer to it in connection with the operation which he
performed (R. 159). When re-offered, counsel for the
plaintiff said he had no objection except that it had not
specifically been called to the attention of the plaintiff.
(R. 175 ).
The plaintiff was familiar with service, manuals
but even if he -was not, it was proper for the jury to
consider whether the service manual adequately apprised
persons who might be removing parts from the car of
the correct manner of doing so and whether the plaintiff
should reasonably have ref erred to it.
POINT V.

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING

INSTRUCTION NO. 16.

Instructions 13 and 4 set forth affirmatively the
obligations of defendant manufacturer. Instruction No.
16 stated the reverse of those instruction in this language:
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"An automobile manufacturer is not liable
for injuriPs resulting when an automobile is used
in a manner it was not intended to he used.
"l\lerely because a product can be used dangPrously or b<•causc a usPr can he subjected to
a dangt>r does not make the product itself danger-ous if it woul<l not he so while heing used as
intended.
.
"A manufacturer is not required to fore,see
all possible ways in which a person may injure
himself nor to protect against all such possibilities or against mismw hy careless persons."
This instruction was based upon Section 165(1),
l\f otor \yt>hick·s, of GO C.•T.8. 'vhich, beginning at page
9:35, providPs:
"A motor vehicle manufacturer is not an insurer, but is only required to exercise ordinary
or reasonable care to see that the vehicle is rnadP.
free from defects which might be reasonably expected to product> in,jury or damage. His duty
is to design or construct his vehicle to be rPasonably safo or fit for the purpose for whieh it was
madP, 'ldH•n used in he manner and for the purpose for which it was supplied. . . . He is not
under a duty to rnakE• automobiles fool-proof or
aeei dent-proof. . . ."
His duty extends to the ordinary
of th<' vPhicle, and lw is not required to anticipate and g-narcl against thP risk of injury to
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those whose own acts or the acts of otlwrs might
cause them injury, nor is he hound to anticipate
and guard against the gross, careless misuse of
the vehicle hy r0cklt>ss drivers."
It is the duty of the trial judge where trial is by
jury to instruct the jury upon the law applicable to the
theories of both parties insofar as such theories are supported by competent evidencP. Hall v. Blackham, 18
Utah 2d lG-1, -117 P. 2<l GG-1.

The substantial evidence of Simpson's departure
from the customary practice in automobile paint shops,
his failure to heed what his own intuition told him, his
falure to refer to the service manual or to make inquiry
of the body shop men amply justified the court in giving
Instruction No. 16 focusing the manufacturer's liability
npon the product's ordinary and inknded nse.
POINT VI.

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING

INSTRUCTION NO. 18.

In Instruction No. 18, the court explained the effect
of contributory nPgligence. That Instruction read as follows:
"Ev0n if vou were to find the defendant negligent and
such negligence was a proximate
cause of the accident, the plaintiff nevertheless
may be barred from recov<>ring damages by contrihutory negligenC('.
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"If you find from a preponderance of the
evidence that the plaintiff was negligent and that
such negligence was a proximate and contributing
cause of tlw arrident, then you verdict must be
aainst the plaintiff and in favor of the defendant,
no cause of action whether or not you also found
the defendant negligent in proximately contributing to the acrident.''
The defendant's Requested Instruction on contributory negligence eontained the speeifications of negligence
dairnt>d by the defondant (H. O:Z). The eourt eliminated
tlw specifieations after disrnssions with counsel.
1' l;· tli<' App<'llant now claims that the ins1rndion was too
hroacl. He did not, however, request a limiting instruction.
1

Tn Galaro1cicz n. vVarrl, 119 Utah 611, 230 P.2d 576
( 19;) 1) the con rt instructed the jury that liability could
not he imposed upon defendant \Varel rnerely because he
ownPd the car nnless the relationship of principal and
agent or master and sPrvant ('Xisted between him and
his son.
Cpon appeal, it was urged that the conrt erred in
failing to define principal and agent and master and
:-:c-1-yant arnl that the instruction 'vas too general. Ftah
Court olm•rved that the plaintiff had not submittNl an:r reqrn•stc>d instrudions further defining
t(•rms and s11.id that in the ahsenc<\ of his having done so,
he cannot be ]ward to complain of the instruction given
in ge1wral tf>nns.
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Counsel for Simpson does not urge that evidence
was received which was outside the scope of the Pretrial
Order, that any argument of counsel "'as made outside
the scope of the issues framed by the Pretrial Order or
that the jury could reasonably have found contributory
negligence on a ground not encompassed by the Pretrial
Order.
vVhy should '\Ve assume the jury found contributory
negligence on a forbidden ground? All preswnptions are
in favor of the validity of thr n'nlid Joseph I'. Orous,
. ;f (/1,1 1() lTt•,l 1l ')_(1('cHc,1 "•o
tJ-t·<) p ')
JchJ (JPQ()._).
J
IDS H 08}J1
J.

•

•

1

J
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CLT 'SIOX

rrhe Appellant in this cnse llkaded his caus0 of action in negligence, stated his contentions at Pretrial in
negligence, tried his case and submitted it to the jury
relying upon negligence as the foundation of his right
to relid.
It "-as not until J udg111ent agai11st him had been
e:ntered that he concluded it may have heen better to
have sought to persuade the court to adopt the doctrine
of strict liabilit>' as a few courts have dmlC'.
If litigants may not change horses in the middle of

the stream, with even greater forre, litigants may not
change horses after they have aniroaehed tlw opposite
bank.
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It i:-; rnanif P:-;t that the
of contributor:: neliw·nce \\·as proper!)- suhrnitted to tht> jury under tht•
evid('llC<' :-;]10wn hy the reronl.

The service manual was relevant to hoth the conduct
of' tlw dt>fendant and the conduct of thP plaintiff. The
instruetions
correct statemPnts of the law.
Jn no sense can it be said that the points complained
of rise to the levt>l of irreversible error. 'I1he verdict
of the jury should be upheld and the Judgment affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
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